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THE INCONCLUSIVENESS OF K R I P K E ' S ARGUMENT 
AGAIMST THE I D E N T I T Y THEORY 
Richard Double 
In the widely-read papers 'Naming and Necessity'1 
and 'Identity and Necessity,'2 Saul Kripke develops an 
argument against the mind-body identity theory, relying 
crucially on the doctrine of the essential painfulness 
of pains. In a reply Fred Feldman rejects Kripke's es-
sentialism of the painfulness of pains view in favor of 
his own preferred essentialism of the physical.3 in 
what follows I claim: (1) there is something plausible 
in both Kripke's and Feldman's brands of essentialism, 
(2) at the present stage of philosophizing on the mind-
body problem there is no good reason to accept either 
essentialism at the expense of rejecting the other, and, 
therefore, (3) tentatively, anyway, we should leave open 
the possibility that both essentialisms are true, i.e., 
that pains both are essentially painful and essentially 
possess certain physical structures. If my argument is 
acceptable, it will show that Kripke's argument against 
the identity theory is at best inconclusive, that is, 
fails. 
1. Since Kripke's technical terminology has become 
familiar, I will explicate only briefly some of the no-
tions used in my paper. The distinction between 'rigid' 
and 'non-rigid' designators is the distinction between 
terms that refer to or have as extensions exactly the 
same individuals in all possible worlds (where they 
exist) and the terms whose reference or extension differs 
in possible worlds (where they exist). 'Benjamin Frank-
lin' is a rigid designator picking out the same individ-
ual in all worlds in which he exists, while 'inventor of 
the bifocals' is a non-rigid designator picking out Ben-
jamin Franklin in this world, but other individuals in 
'possible worlds' where someone else invented bifocals. 
A correlative distinction is that between rigidly fixing 
the reference of a term by an essential property of the 
referent and non-rigidly fixing the reference by an ac-
cidental property. For instance, I can non-rigidly fix 
the reference (give myself to know to what I am refer-
ring) of 'Cicero' by Cicero's accidental property of 
being the denouncer of Cataline; I can also rigidly fix 
'Cicero' by an essential property of Cicero, e.g. (with 
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Kripke) his biological origin from a particular egg and 
sperm. 
Let me now state Kripke's argument against the 
identity theory, relying on Feldman's rendition: 1* 
Let 'A' name a particular pain and 'B' the brain 
state that the identity theorist wishes to iden-
tify witli it. 
(1) If x and y are rigid designators, if x = y, 
then necessarily x = y. 
(2) 'A' is a rigid designator. 
(3) 'B 1 is a rigid designator. 
(4) 'A = B' is not necessarily true. 
(5) Therefore, A i B. 
It should be noted that although Kripke presents objec-
tions against three kinds of identity theories, viz., 
the identity of persons with their bodies, the identity 
of types of mental states with types of physical states , 
and the identity of particular mental events with par-
ticular physical events, I shall follow Feldman in re-
stricting my rebuttal to the identity of particular 
events. This may involve a bit of tugging at Kripke's 
exposition to get it into line, but hopefully not much. 
I think my argument can be applied in an obvious way to 
deal with Kripke's objections to the other versions of 
the identity theory, but I shall not attempt that here. 
For the purposes of this paper, I shall not ques-
tion (l)-(3). This brings us to the crux of things, 
Kripke's claim that 'A = B'is not necessary. Kripke 
supports (4) by saying it seems logically possible that 
B should exist without A and A exist without B: 
. . . it would seem that it is at least logically 
possible that B should have existed . . . without 
(the subject) feeling any pain at all, and thus 
without the presence of A.5 
. . . just as it seems that the brain state could 
have existed without any pain, so it seems that 
the pain could have existed without the correspond-
ing brain state.6 
These two claims will hereafter be referred to as Kripke's 
'Cartesian intuitions. 1 
At this point let us consider Feldman's objection. 
It is significant that Feldman does not deny Kripke's 
claim that it is possible that B occur without there 
being any pain. Feldman insists, however, that this oc-
currence would not entail that B occurs without A: 
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If A, which is a pain in the actual world, can 
occur in other worlds without being a pain in 
those worlds, then it is still possible that A 
occurs wherever B occurs. Thus for all Kripke 
has shown, it may be necessarily true that A 
is identical with B. 7 
Feldman's view is that those particular events that 
we recognize as pains and that identity theorists wish 
to identify with brain states may, in other 'possible 
worlds' be tickles, or itches, or perhaps not even sen-
sations at all: it is only a contingent fact that these 
events are pains. Whatever particular phenomenal prop-
erty these events have is extrinsic to their identity, 
in that they would be the same events even with differ-
ent phenomenal properties, that is, were different sen-
sations. The phenomenal property of painfulness (or, 
with Kripke and Feldman, the property of being a pain) 
is not an essential property of the events that are 
pains in the real world. In another world these events 
may not be pains. (It is perhaps worth pointing out 
that although Feldman correctly labels Kripke's doctrine 
'essentialist,' Feldman too has opted for a brand of es-
sentialism—an essentialism of the physical. For Feld-
man it is the physical structure of B that is the essen-
tial property of B and the criterion of identification of 
B in possible worlds where B may be another sensation (or 
no sensation at all).) 
Feldman distinguishes between two claims: the first, 
that it is necessary that if something is a pain, then it 
has the property of being a pain; and the second, that if 
something is a pain, then the property of being a pain is 
a necessary property of that thing. This distinction is 
the one between necessity de_ dicto and de_ re: 
de dicto: 0 (x) (x is a pain > x has the property 
of being a pain) 
de re: (x) (x is a pain • x has the property 
of being a pain) 
Feldman says that although the de_ dicto claim is accept-
able, it is insufficient to defend Kripke's premise C O 
against his objection; and although the de_ re_ claim is 
strong enough, it is dubious. 
Kripke anticipated this objection in 'Naming and 
Necessity,' and argued for the de_ re claim: 
Can any case of essence be more obvious than the 
fact that being a pain is a necessary property of 
each pain? . . . Consider a particular pain, or 
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other sensation that you once had. Do you find it 
at all plausible that that very sensation could 
have existed without being a sensation the way a 
certain inventor (Franklin) could have existed 
without being an inventor?8 
Kripke's point seems well-taken. Denying Kripke's de_ re_ 
claim implies the possibility of, e.g., pains in the real 
world being tickles in possible world 2, and this cer-
tainly looks uncanny, at first blush anyway. It doesn't 
seem possible that a pain might have been a tickle in 
the way Nixon might have belonged to the SDS. (Though 
this is perhaps a little uncanny, too.) One wonders, 
how could a pain have been a tickle or no sensation at 
all? For we are not being asked to imagine different 
sensations merely getting correlated with the same brain 
state in various possible worlds; this could happen due 
to different neural 'wiring.' We are being asked to 
imagine the possibility of this sensation being another 
sensation, and all the while identical to the same brain 
state. I conclude from the strangeness of this possi-
bility that Kripke's essentialism of the phenomenal 
claim is at least prima facie plausible and, if possible, 
should be accepted. 
We have seen that Feldman accommodates Kripke's 
claim to be able to imagine B existing without being a 
pain, by claiming that being a pain is only a nonessen-
tial property of B. But Feldman does not accept Kripke's 
claim that this implies he is imagining B apart from A — 
Feldman denies Kripke is justified in moving from the 
former to the latter claim. That is, Feldman points out 
that Kripke may be mistaking the exact description he 
gives to his Cartesian intuition. The same point is 
clear if we look at what reply Feldman is constrained to 
make to the second half of the Cartesian intuitions , 
Kripke's belief that it is logically possible for A to 
exist without being B. Feldman must say: The case you 
have imagined is simply one where some pain or other is 
not identical to B, and surely this is possible. But 
you are not justified in claiming the pain you have 
imagined is A. Nor are you justified in claiming any 
other sensation you can imagine apart from B really is 
A either.9 You see, if A is necessarily B, you cannot 
imagine A existing without being B. You may be imagining 
some other sensation and mistaking it for A. 
My proposal is that we allow Kripke's essentialism 
of the phenomenal, while leaving open the possibility 
that the identity theory is correct. We can have the 
best of Kripke (the de_ re claim) and Feldman (the iden-
tity theory) at the cost of extending somewhat Feldman's 
reply to Kripke that Kripke may be mistaking the exact 
nature of his Cartesian intuitions. 
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Let us consider this proposed compromise position. 
First it shares a feature with (and I claim, is no worse 
off than) Feldman's tack, i.e., they both dispute the 
exact characterization of what Kripke claims to imagine. 
Feldman says Kripke is not justified in characterizing 
his (true) intuition of B existing not identical to pain 
as B existing not identical to A; I claim Kripke is not 
justified in characterizing his intuition as one of B 
existing not identical to pain, rather than some B-
like thing not identical to pain. Second, my position 
has the advantage over Feldman's of not denying the com-
mon sensical essentialism of the phenomenal doctrine. 
Third, my position derives support from whatever prag-
matic considerations that provide support for Feldman's 
view. That is, it is not obvious that pains cannot 
have physical structures for essential properties; if 
the identity theory is correct, then they do; and if it 
is a 'framework feature 1 of pains that they do not, then 
we may supercede that framework when considering the 
mind-body question. 
To get an idea of what I mean by 'pragmatic con-
siderations, 1 let us look at a passage from Richard 
Rorty where he asks us to consider Pains instead of 
pains: 
. . .it is of the essence of Pain (a natural 
kind which turns up in any world in which there 
are stimulated C-fibers) to be a stimulation of 
C-fibers, but it is contingent that in this world 
. . .it comes on with a certain phenomenological 
quality. . .[Kripke] wants us to consider the 
immediate phenomenological awfulness as_ o_f the 
essence, but what gets to be of the essence is 
. . .determined. . .by looking at the context of 
discourse about the thing in question. The 
identity theorist is suggesting a new context, 
which, he thinks puts the whole matter in a new 
light, and which has various philosophical advan-
tag e s . 1 0 [italics mine] 
Rorty considers the objection that although Pains may 
provide a way of defeating Kripke's premise C O , he 
has changed the subject from pains to Pains. Rorty 
admits that though this is true, "one man's changed 
subject is another's metaphysical discovery."H 
The most obvious moral one might wish to draw 
from Rorty's example is that Kripke's de_ re_ claim is 
not forever immune from overthrow, given various possible 
alternative ways of 'carving up' (insights into?) 
natural kinds. For my part, I wish to rely on a 
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weaker claim that underlies Rorty's view: even in the 
realm of the mental we cannot exhaustively determine 
the essential properties of things simply by ratio-
cination. In particular, we cannot justifiably 'intuit* 
what the sum of the essential properties of pain are. 
Other empirical and philosophical considerations are 
relevant to such a judgment. Such considerations could 
conceivably make it reasonable to add to our concept of 
pain another essential property—that of having a certain 
physical structure. Perhaps, sometime, it will be 
reasonable to ascribe to pains an essential property 
we do not now. Perhaps not. But we should not fore-
close the possibility by overestimating the value of 
our present intuitions on mind-body identity. 
2. So far, I have accepted Kripke's essentialism 
of the phenomenal, and conceded that we do not ordinar-
ily regard essentialism of the physical regarding pains 
as at all plausible. Further, I have claimed that 
Kripke has correctly interpreted his Cartesian intui-
tions if and only if the identity theory is wrong, 
and that at this time we have no way of knowing whether 
Kripke or the identity theory is right. 
Let us make one last try at seeing whether Kripke's 
Cartesian intuitions are inconclusive as I claim. 
Kripke seems to think that the burden of proof is on 
the identity theorist to 'explain away' the Cartesian 
intuitions; and if he cannot, the identity theory is 
refuted: 
Someone who wishes to maintain an identity 
thesis cannot (accept) the Cartesian intuitions 
that A can exist without B, that B can exist 
without A. ^ . He_ must explain these intuitions 
away, showing how they are illusory ,T2 [my 
italics-] 
Kripke then argues that the identity theorist 
cannot 'explain away 1 the Cartesian intuitions. 
(I) The only plausible means to explain away 
counter-examples to identity statements is 
by arguing we are in illusion because we 
fixed the reference of at least one of the 
rigid designators by an accidental property 
such that it is a contingent fact that the 
referent possess that contingent property. 
(II) In the case of A and B we cannot argue this 
way since we fix the reference of A and B 
by their essential properties. 
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Kripke concludes from (I) and (II), plus his burden of 
proof principle (If you cannot explain away the example, 
it refutes the identity claim) that the identity theory 
is probably wrong. 
We can see the idea behind (I) and (II) in the 
contrast Kripke draws between trying to defeat the 
(presumably faulty) objection that there is a possible 
world where heat is not molecular motion and the 
Cartesian objection to the identity theory. According 
to Kripke, the reason we falsely think we can imagine 
molecular motion and heat occurring apart is that we 
fix the reference of 'heat' by its accidental property 
of causing the sensation of heat. This is an in-
essential property because had our neurological systems 
been different we might have felt nothing at all on 
exposure to molecular movement. What we are really 
imagining, says Kripke, is merely a situation where 
the cause of sensations of heat is not molecular 
motion. Of course, this is possible, but it does not 
refute the identity claim, since the property of 
causing the sensation of heat is a property heat may 
possess in some worlds and lack in others. When we 
fix the reference of heat rigidly, e.g., heat itself, 
rather than non-rigidly, we see that it is not possible 
that heat be anything other than what it really is — 
molecular motion. 
According to Kripke, the case is different in the 
Cartesian counter-example. When the Cartesian says 
he can imagine A and B occurring apart, he is not 
fixing the reference of either term by an accidental 
property. He is fixing the reference of 'A' rigidly 
by something like that which is associated with pain-
ful sensations and 'B' by some essential micro-struc-
tural property. Thus, according to Kripke, the Car-
tesian objection cannot be circumvented in the same 
way the heat-molecular movement objection was: 
Because ['A1 and 'B'] pick out their objects 
essentially, we cannot say the case where you 
seem to imagine the identity statement false is 
really an illusion like the illusion one gets 
in the case of heat and molecular motion, because 
that illusion depended on the fact that we pick 
out heat by a certain contingent property. 13 
To develop my reply let us consider Kripke's 
rebuttal to the objector who claims to imagine heat 
existing apparent from molecular motion. Kripke 
says the objector is mistaken because he is fixing 
'heat' by the contingent property of producing the 
sensation of warmth, but if he fixed the reference of 
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'heat' by an essential property he could not imagine it 
apart from molecular motion. 
But suppose the objector replies to Kripke: "Look, 
I am not making the simple-minded mistake you say I am 
when I claim to imagine heat that is not molecular 
motion. I am not merely being confused by the possibil-
ity that molecular motion might not cause the sensation 
of warmth. What I am claiming is that I can imagine 
this very phenomenoa of heat which you claim to be iden-
tical to molecular motion existing in absence of molecu-
lar motion." 
What could Kripke say? All he could say is that the 
objector's claim is false because heat is" identical to 
molecular motion, and that's that. That is, whatever the 
objector is imagining, it is not heat; perhaps it is some 
heat-like phenomenon, but whatever it is it is not the 
phenomenon we were talking about when we identified heat 
with molecular motion. But if this is the only sort of 
reply Kripke can make when pushed by the persistent 
objector to 'heat = molecular motion,' then there is 
nothing wrong with replying in like fashion to Kripke's 
Cartesian intuitions. 
My view is that regarding imaginability claims, 
'pains - brain states' is iii principle in the same 
boat with 'heat = molecular motion. ' the actual dif-
ference between the two is that since we are more con-
vinced the latter is true, we are quicker to reject 
dogmatically thought-examples that purport to show the 
contingency of the identity. But, I think, it is pos-
sible that someday 'pains = brain states' may assume 
for us the (relative) immunity from thought examples 
that we presently accord 'heat = molecular motion.' 
One might object that the two identity statements 
are not analogous as regards imaginability challenges, 
because we can describe a coherent story about pains 
not being brain states while we cannot like tell a 
coherent story about heat not being molecular motion. 
I admit we can tell a coherent story about A existing 
without being identical to B if mind-body dualism is 
logically possible, and certainly we ordinarily sup-
pose mind-body dualism is possible. But if a dualism 
of heat and molecular motion is logically possible, then 
we can also tell a coherent story about the non-identity 
of heat and molecular motion. And prima facie it seems 
that many of the traditional positions on the mind-
body problem have analogues that are logically possible 
in the heat-molecular motion case. The difference 
between the two 'dualisms' is merely that, since we 
have already accepted the identity of heat and molecular 
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motion, we have opted to count as logically impossible 
a view that seemed prima facie logically possible — 
dualism of heat-molecular motion. But if we were to 
accept the identity in the mind-body case, then we 
would also conclude we cannot tell a coherent story 
about pains not being identical to brain states. 
Imaginability claims are defeasible, and we have 
to know how much weight to accord them. In the case 
of the persistent objector to 'heat = molecular motion,' 
we reject his claim quickly. We are pretty sure that 
heat is molecular motion. But we are not nearly as 
sure that pains are brain states, so we are not so 
quick to reject the claim that the two can be imagined 
apart. But we should not accept the counter-example 
either, since acceptance of it, pluB the necessity-of-
identity principle implies a definite position of the 
mind-body relation. A cautious agnosticism is the 
best course.II * 
Rutgers University 
*I am grateful to Sarah Ayres , William Alston, and 
Larry Stanton for helpful comments. 
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l l*I have cast my paper in terms of "rigid" and "non-
rigid" designation and reference-fixing because this is 
how Kripke presents his argument. A number of people 
feel, with Feldman and Rorty,—whether due to distrust 
of Kripke's categories or fondness for simplicity of 
exposition—that Kripke's argument can be better set 
out without mentioning the technical terms: 
(i) All pains are essentially painful. 
(ii) No brain states are essentially painful. 
(iii) Therefore, no pains are brain states. 
If one casts Kripke's argument this way, my objection is 
to (ii) while Feldman's is to (i). 
